.... .‘We would make a preemptive strike,’ said the shah, ‘and have the Persian Gulf in our hands before the Americans find out’...

sweep cast and then south to secure Abadan and its surrounding oil fields.”

lie put the photographs aside. “All in all we have counted about 1 .700 tanks in that corridor east of the Tigris—800 1-55’s, 450 M-60’s, and around 500 BTR-152’s. They represent 90 per cent of the total tank force Iraq possesses. This type of concentration has never occurred before. At least half of the Iraqi forces have always been kept in the north, to contain and destroy the Kurds. Furthermore, the entire Iraqi Air Force has been on alert since last Wednesday. The army reserves were recalled last Monday. All this is, of course, quite easy for you to verify.” The marshal spoke: “I shall be leaving Italy for Moscow tomorrow afternoon. You will hear from us immediately thereafter.”

Grechko bowed, turned, and left. Minutes later the shah walked out of the chalet with his wife and children. It was a perfect day for skiing.

The French began arriving at nine the following morning, in black Citroëns, of course. The first group was from the Dassault-Breguet Aviation Company, the largest French aircraft producer. The subject under discussion: the Mirage F l’s. In fact, 120 of them. In addition to the aircraft, the package Dassault hoped to sell included 1,500 Matra R.530 missiles (some with radar, and others with infrared homing heads), as well as 500 of the new French laser-guided stand-off weapon (its characteristics being very similar to the American Phoenix), which tested out with a better than 95 per cent hit rate even on targets as small as single armored vehicles, or parked aircraft. If accepted, this deal would have major long-term consequences for France. It, not the United States or Russia, would become the chief supplier of arms to the biggest single customer for weapons that had ever existed—the shahanshah. The French asking price for this initial package was $5.1 billion. They proposed that 50 per cent be paid on signing, the other half on delivery. The shah, in the preliminary discussion earlier that year, had indicated he would prefer another mode of payment. For the shah was very cash-flow-conscious (his cash was earning him 15 per cent per annum at Chase Manhattan in London). He preferred to pay in kind. And kind, in Iran. means crude Oil.

This was the reason for the second delegation, which arrived at a little ast ten, only minutes after the Dassault presentation, flip charts and all, had been completed. The second group was typical of French negotiation teams in that it included a mix of both private and governmental interests—in this case. the heads of the Commisariat the French National Energy Inc., Compagnie Nationale Francaise de Pétrole,and Gazde France. The deal being ofTered them? Seven billion barrels of Iranian crude, over seven years, at a base price of S 11.50 a barrel, to rise at the rate of only 6.5 per cent per annum for the length of the contract. Not as good as the offer to the Russians, but the French didn’t know that.

The second stage of the French-Iranian conference was brief. The French accepted, without reservation, the shah’s proposal. They were prepared to sign on the spot. But the shah was not. All depended on the outcome of yet a further meeting. But he merely told both the oil and arms men that his final decision would be given the following Monday. It would be communicated to them by his ambassador in Paris. They could now leave. So they left.

It was only after the grounds of the Suvretta had been completely cleared of black Citroëns that the final delegation arrived. They came in an Alouette military helicopter provided courtesy of the Swiss government, which had also guaranteed the complete secrecy of the operation.

This final meeting involved only five men: the shah, his two military advisers, the personal delegate of Premier Giscard d’Estaing, and the chief of staff of the French military forces. The shah wasted no time in making his proposal, which, he said, required only a out or a non.

He wanted to borrow a half-dozen atomic bombs from France. Vie would return them on December 31, 1976.

“Why this particular date?” asked Giscard’s right-hand man.

“Because by then we will have built some of our own, replied the king of kings.

The problem was that he. the shahanshah, was under dire threat of nuclear blackmail right now, in February of 1976. and he could hardly counter such a threat with bombs that he would not have until the end of the Near. Thus the need for this short-term loan.

Were there any possible circumstances under which the French bombs might be used?

Of course not! You could not fight and win a nuclear war with only six

bombs! He needed them only to be able to honestly” counter a probable Iraqi-Soviet nuclear bluff. If he could not, the chances were very high indeed that Iran would become yet another satellite within the Soviet orbit. Such was obviously not in France’s interest, especially now when Iran was about to develop into France’s largest single export market on the one hand, while guaranteeing France’s future petroleum supply on the other. N’est-ce pas?

The two Frenchmen demurred from offering any opinion whatsoever. But they did guarantee that the shah’s thoughts would be communicated to Paris forthwith. ‘This time it was the shah’s guests who rose first. You must grant the French at least one thing:

they understand upmanship.

So by noon of that Friday, February 20, the shah was once again alone with his generals. But by this point he had had enough of them. He’d also had enough of skiing. So he dismissed his military aides, ignored his family. strolled out of the chalet, and disappeared into the north wing of the Suvretta House.

He always reserved 40 rooms there during his sojourns in St. Moritz for his entourage, security men, communications people, hangers-on. It also served, rumor had it, as the shah’s indoor-winter-sports center. More specifically, it was suggested that the shah had an ongoing penchant for dark-haired German girls, along Soraya lines, and that he maintained a fairly sizable stable of such in the north wing. And why not? The Old Testament is full of emperors and kings who did the same thing: Solomon, David, Ahasuerus, to name but a few. And the shah was a great believer in tradition—in the obligation of tradition.

Thus it was that the shah only emerged once again into the daylight around 2 P.M. that Sunday. He returned to the chalet just in time to receive two messages: a da from Moscow, a oui from Paris. Now he could return to Teheran and start his war.

The Two-Day War began at 6:30 AM. on Sunday, February 29, 1976. The shah’s astrologer had approved of this date, and his court historians had concurred. No ruler, to their knowledge. had ever chosen an intercalary day to begin a war. And it was the reestablishment of an empire—the ancient Sassanid Empire—that was at stake.

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